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Abstract 
In this paper, we will discuss the possibilities of the development of nuclear energy in the 
world in the midterm and long term. We will correlate the prospects with the emissions of 
CO2  and  the  effects  on  climate  change.  In  particular  we  will  discuss  the  problems 
nuclear energy face to make a large contribution to the climate change issue. 
 
Introduction 
Concerns about the consequences of climate change have increased significantly in the 
last  years.  The  United  Nations  Climate  Change  Conference  in  Copenhagen  in 
December 2009 will try to work out a way for the world to act together to preserve the 
planet in the face of rising temperatures for after 2012, the end of the Kyoto protocol. 
However, getting all the major governments to agree on one solution seems a very long 
way off. The essential problem is burden-sharing: which countries are going to cut their 
CO2 emissions, and by how much? It has become apparent that global emissions of CO2 
are shooting up at a rate that far exceeds anything the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) thought possible in its scenarios of 2000. 2 
 
It is now obvious that all countries need to be in the next climate change agreement -  
developed  countries  including  the  United  States  as  well  as  developing  countries 
including  China  and  India.  In  the  Clean  Development  Mechanisms,  nuclear  power 
should  be  included.  Since  the  election  of  President  Obama,  the  energy-environment 
questions are priorities in the United States which is back in the negotiations and is 
ready to take the lead in tackling climate change. 
With the new environmental constraints, governments are re-evaluating nuclear power 
as a possible solution to global warming. 
The use of nuclear power in electricity generation is on the rise, especially in Asia. In the 
Western hemisphere, only a few countries have phase-out policies for nuclear energy, 
while most other governments are extending the licenses of existing reactors and/or are 
building  new  reactors.  The  nuclear  renaissance  today  in  the  already-developed 
countries is driven both by considerations of energy security and by the climate change 
threat. Yet, nuclear power is highly controversial. IPCC Chairman Rajendra K. Pachauri 
makes  certain  reservations: nuclear energy  is  not  for everyone  he  says  On the  one 
hand, it bears high risks for humans and the environment, including the risk of nuclear 
proliferation. On the other hand, climate experts increasingly argue that nuclear power is 
an essential element of a low-carbon energy supply. What role should nuclear power 
play in the future energy mix? 
This paper is divided into three parts. In the first section, we will present our view about 
what is the upper limit of the possible development of nuclear energy in the near and 
mid-term and the more distant future and therefore its maximum role as a mitigator of 
carbon dioxide emissions. In the second section, we will discuss the important factors 3 
 
influencing the development of nuclear power. In the last section, we will review the 
situation in three countries important for nuclear power: the United States, France and 
China. 
Section I: Energy Scenarios 
Usually three dates are most used:  up to 2030, up to 2050, and up to 2100 for the 
longer term.  Let us begin by discussing the short-term future - for energy - 20 years, we 
believe, is a short term. 
I.1 The period 2010-2030 
For  this  time frame  we  have  many  scenarios  and calculations of  what may happen, 
provided  by  many  diverse  and  respectable  institutions.  among  them  -    the  Nuclear 
Energy  Agency  (NEA)  of  the  OECD,  the  World  Nuclear  Assocaition  (WNA),  the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA),  the  OECD  International  Energy  Agency 
(IEA),  as  well  as  BP-Exane  (BP  is  Banque  Paribas,  Exane  is  a  private  consulting 
company). The common characteristic of these projections is that they have at least two 
scenarios, one high and one low. The IEA does not call them high and low, but rather 
"reference scenario" and "450 scenario," corresponding to stabilization of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere at 450 parts per million in 2030.  The other characteristic of 
these scenarios is that the low scenarios have practically no growth of nuclear capacity, 
or very slight growth or even a slight decrease, that is, 10 percent or 20 percent over the 
20  years.  The  high scenarios  are  more  diverse:  one  can find  scenarios  that lead  to 
between 600 gigawatts and 890 GWe of nuclear power capacity in operation in 2030, as 
compared to the 372 GWe of today. 4 
 
IEA's World Energy Outlook (WEO) - a very serious review and prognosis of energy 
situations in 2030, was published in 2007 and 2008. In 2007 the WEO projected 833 
GWe  of  nuclear  capacity  in  2030;  for  the  same  scenario  in  2008,  the  prognosis  for 
nuclear is 640 GWe in 2030. This is quite a large variation and shows the volatility of 
expected values because things are complicated and change quickly. The complications 
stems from the fact that we have to deal not only with economic and technical problems 
but also with political and social issues, especially if one is talking about nuclear energy. 
The predictions are therefore quite difficult: how a given governments and societies will 
behave over this length of time is not an easy thing to predict. 
Considering the situation as of August 2009 based on available recent studies, it seems 
that a value of around 800 GWe installed nuclear capacity in 2030 is a reasonable upper 
limit. This corresponds to some 6 gigatonnes of CO2saved if we assume that nuclear 
electricity generation from these 800 GWe replaces coal-fired generation with present 
technology and without Carbon Capture and Storage, or CCS, systems. When and if 
CCS is  available on  an  industrial  scale,  its  cost may  make coal  less  attractive  than 
nuclear as a source of electricity. 
We believe that the most likely competition for more nuclear capacity will come from 
coal. Indeed, renewable energy sources will be installed at a maximum rate compatible 
with some specific limit, like adequate sitting for new hydro and windpower plants, and 
with the amount of subsidies that different nations will be willing to pay for these kinds of 
electricity. This is because at least for baseload electricity produced in large plants and 
for large grids, which still will represent the great majority of future electricity production. 
Renewables are now, and are likely to remain, more expensive than coal or nuclear. For 5 
 
example, the recent tender in France for a large amount of electricity to be produced by 
biomass gave a result of some125 euros per MWh, as compared with 54 euros per 
MWh from the new Flamanville reactor, or some 60 euros per MWh for future nuclear 
plants in France, and around 30 euros per MWh for the existing French nuclear plants, 
which were cheaper to build. In the UK, about half the regional councils solicited refused 
permission to install wind farms on their territory, which led one of the main producers of 
wind power equipment in the UK to lower its output substantially below its capacity. At 
the same time, in the IEA WEO 2008, one finds values for MWh from wind, gas, coal 
and nuclear for selected regions of the world. The values for windpower seem close to 
those from coal and nuclear and much cheaper than that for gas. However, there is an 
element that is not often included in these projections: the fact that windpower has to be 
taken when it is available.  That means that during peak demand, for example during 
very hot or very cold weather, the probability of having windpower may be 25% or even 
less  depending  on  the  meteorology.  This  characteristic  is  certainly  a  problem  for 
windpower and should normally decrease the calculated value of electricity produced by 
wind, by a factor that may depend on local conditions, the quantity of windpower, and on 
the  type  of  grids  to  which  the  electricity  is  sold,  but  it  is  certainly  not  negligible. 
Therefore,  even  if  the  cost  of  windpower  seems  to  be  not  too  far  from  the  cost  of 
electricity generated by other fuels, electricity consumers pay a subsidy by accepting 
windpower at prices which do not take into account the aleatory nature of windpower.  
As for gas, as we mentioned earlier, the WEO 2008 indicated that the cost of baseload 
electricity produced by gas presently is substantially higher than that from coal, nuclear 
or wind. But in addition one can expect an evolution which will be negative for electricity 6 
 
produced from gas because resources of gas are being slowly but inevitably exhausted. 
A recent British Petroleum survey projected some 60 years for the available natural gas 
resource base if it is used at today's pace. This number may decrease if gas is used 
more extensively. In addition, the easiest and cheapest resources are the first to be 
exhausted  and  also  probably  those  that  are  less  sensitive  from  the  geopolitical 
viewpoint. The geopolitics of gas resources are not very favorable, and this may add to 
the tension around prices in the future as well as to the issue of security of supply to 
which every consumer and producer of electricity is sensitive. 
I.2 The periods 2010-2050 and 2100 
There are fewer detailed projections for the time period 2030-2050. The best-known are 
the IEA Energy Technology Outlook 2008 and the NEA Nuclear Energy Outlook 2008. 
There exist also general scenarios, notably in the book published by the Institute for 
Sustainable Energy Development under the auspices of UNESCO in 2009, and an older 
study  with  the  participation  of  NEA,  IAEA,  Los  Alamos  National  Laboratory,  the 
University of Tokyo, the Russian Academy of Sciences and University Paris Dauphine, 
published by CGEMP in 2002, which covers the period up to 2100. 
The  highest  values  of  these  different  projections  and  scenarios  correspond  to  1,400 
GWe to 2,000 GWe of nuclear power in operation by the year 2050. The average value 
of  the  high  projections  for  2050  is  1,700  GWe  of  nuclear  capacity  in  operation, 
corresponding to an annual saving of some 13 gigatonnes of CO2assuming that nuclear 
replaces coal-fired power plants without CCS. To appreciate the impact of this quantity 
of avoided emissions on climate change, one may mention that the difference between 
the unsustainable "business as usual" scenario and the sustainable "450 stabilization" of 7 
 
the IEA WEO corresponds to the emission of 19 Gt of CO2per annum in 2030. The 
UNESCO  and  CGEMP  scenarios  indicate  values  of  5,000  to  7,500  GWe  of  nuclear 
capacity in the year 2100. If realized, this would have a decisive beneficial impact on 
CO2emissions at that date. 
We will not try to make a new prognosis or to compete with the important institutions 
mentioned  above. But  let  us  mention  a few  major  factors  which  influence  the  future 
development  of  nuclear  energy,  and  also  discuss  the  situation  in  a  few  selected 
countries that are important for the development of nuclear power, since the interplay 
between those factors is quite different from one country to the other. 
Section II: Important factors for the development of nuclear power 
II.1  General 
-    The  will  and  the  determination  of  national  governments,  especially  of  large  CO2-
emitting nations, to limit their contribution to climate change, and agreement  on this 
issue between developed and emerging countries; 
-  The sensitivity of nations and societies, especially certain important ones, to the health 
effects of local and regional pollution by fossil fuel combustion. We are thinking about 
SO2, NOx and particulate emissions, among others; recently some in the US brought up 
the issue of mercury emissions; 
- The ability of industry to build and operate a large fleet of nuclear plants in a safe, 
reliable, timely and cost-effective way. 
-  Support by public and national and international authorities for different fuels based on 
comparative  evaluation  of  their  merits  and  drawbacks,  including  environmental  and 8 
 
health effects, safety, economy and security of supply - and not an emotional approach 
for choosing solutions. 
- The sensitivity of national governments and societies to the selection of the cheapest 
solution, considering that money or resources spent on energy or on electricity supply 
will restrict the available resources for other important social issues, like provision of 
food, health care, education and others. 
- The technical and economic success, of commercial-scale CCS and, in the near term, 
the perception of the potential for this technology. 
II. 2 Weak points of nuclear power 
There are also four characteristics of nuclear energy that are often considered as its 
weak points.  
- The first is the issue of the risk associated with large accidents. The excellent 
operation  of  Generation  2  reactors  and  the  improved  safety  characteristics  of 
Generation 3 reactors which, even in the event of a very large, and very unlikely, 
accident,  will  not  impose  large  damage  to  the  environment,  make  the  safety 
performance of nuclear energy very favorable compared to coal, gas and  even 
hydro power plants. However, the public perception of nuclear plant safety may still 
pose a problem. 
-    There seems  to  be  a  consensus  that  at least final  nuclear  waste  should  be 
placed  in  deep  geologic  repositories.  However,  the  major  issue  here  is  the 
"NIMBY" effect - Not In My Back Yard - which makes it extremely difficult to select 
a site because of opposition from local people. Today in western countries, only 9 
 
Finland and Sweden have resolved this NIMBY issue. This issue is likely to remain 
difficult, but may be resolved more easily in large countries like Russia, China and 
India. We believe it is strongly connected with the perception by the public and 
politicians of the need for, and environmental and economic benefits of, nuclear 
energy. Technically, the risk associated with deep-geologic disposal seems much 
lower than that associated with waste from other types of energy production (fossil 
fuels) or even from other industries. It may also be minimized by introduction of fast 
reactors. It is, however, a delicate issue, but should not be insoluble. 
-    The  issue  of  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons  is  connected  with  sensitive 
technology used in nuclear power - uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing -- 
and  not  really  with  the  construction  and  operation  of  nuclear  power  plants. 
Worldwide  expansion  of  nuclear  energy  will  therefore  require  the  institution  of 
internationally safeguarded  programs aimed to  assure customers of secure fuel 
supply - such as nuclear fuel banks or other mechanisms envisaged under GNEP, 
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, or the Putin Initiative. In any case, for a very 
large fraction of the nuclear plants to be built in the next 20 to 40 years, this issue 
is practically resolved. Indeed, the vast majority of countries that can be expected 
to  build  nuclear  plants  over  this  period  either  have  nuclear  weapons  and  the 
technology  needed  to  build them, or  already  have  sensitive  technology  but  are 
considered as members in good standing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or agree 
to renounce sensitive technology in exchange for assured nuclear fuel supply. 10 
 
This  is  even  more  true  now  that  India  has  concluded  an  agreement  with  the 
Nuclear  Suppliers  Group,  even  if  some  details  about  transfer  of  sensitive 
technology (reprocessing) remain to be worked out. 
-    The  transitional  character  of  short-term  present  nuclear  plant  technology.  If 
dynamic development of nuclear power is to occur, the issue of uranium resources 
may  appear  as  a  constraint  for  present  nuclear  power  technology  in  the  years 
2050-2060.    Indeed,  all  reasonable  and  speculative  uranium  resources  (see 
IAEA/NEA "Red Book" 2007) may be required to provide the necessary fuel for 
reactors built up to that time. Therefore, the key condition is the development of 
fast breeder reactors capable of using uranium at least 60 times more efficiently 
than today's reactors, which use only about 1% of natural uranium. In addition, 
breeders  may  justify  utilization  of  very  expensive  resources  such  as  those 
contained  in  granite  and  seawater,  as  well  as  thorium,  extending  available 
resources by a factor of more than 100 and therefore the energy potential by a 
factor  of  more than  6,000.  This  would make  nuclear  energy  a  quasi-renewable 
energy source.   
This quasi-renewable quality of nuclear energy would make its development much more 
attractive for society compared to the limited role of the present-day technology. Unlike 
nuclear  fusion  technology,  fast  breeder  technology  exists.  But  of  course  it  must  be 
improved, especially as regards the fuel cycle. Many fast breeder reactors have been 
operated successfully in the world and some are still in operation, notably the BN-600 
(600 MWe) in Russia which has been operated for more than 20 years with a very high 
capacity factor. The Russians are building an improved version of BN-600 called BN-800 11 
 
(800 MWe), now expected to operate in 2014, and have tentative plans for a 1,600-MWe 
fast  breeder  of  a  similar  design.  Meanwhile,  the  Indians  are  building  a  500-MWe 
prototype fast breeder that is tentatively scheduled to operate in 2011, and have plans to 
build four more of the same type by 2020. There are indications that the Chinese, who 
are  finishing  construction  of  a  100-MW-thermal  fast  reactor,  are  also  interested  in 
purchasing the Russian BN-800 technology.   
France  successfully  operated  Rapsodie  (40  MWth),  Phenix  (250  MWe),  and 
Superphenix (1200 MWe). The first two reactors were shut down at the end of their 
useful life, but operation of the Superphenix was interrupted unfortunately by a political 
decision  that  was  not  justified  on  technical  and  economic  grounds.  France  now  has 
plans  to  build  a  prototype  of  a  new  generation  of  fast  breeder  reactors  which  is 
scheduled to operate in 2020 (under provisions of the 2006 nuclear waste program act, 
confirmed  by  a  recent  interview  of  the  Administrator  General  of  the  Commissariat  à 
l'Energie Atomique). Japan also plans to build a similar new-generation fast breeder 
reactor  prototype  for  operation  around  2025.  However,  some  important  countries, 
notably the US, do not consider breeder reactors as attractive, at least on the political 
level, making therefore their enthusiasm for nuclear power less obvious.  
Section III. Country overview 
Let us now review the situation in a few selected countries: the United States, France, 
China (see also Zaleski 2009) 
III.1 United States 12 
 
The US is the world's largest producer of nuclear energy and has more than 100 GWe 
installed. The present technology most used in the world - light water reactors - was 
developed in the US. However, the experience of construction of nuclear plants in the 
US in the 1970s and 1980s was quite disastrous. The initial construction schedules and 
budgets  were  exceeded  by  a  factor  of  two  to  three,  making  nuclear  generation  not 
competitive  with  alternatives.  This  was  not  connected  with  the  technology  itself,  but 
rather with a sharp evolution in nuclear safety requirements following the accident at 
Three Mile Island in 1978, requiring modifications to the design during construction, the 
lack  of  standardization  of  the  designs,  strong  societal  opposition,  and  unfavorable 
regulatory and legal systems (Zaleski, 2006). 
In contrast, the operation of the large fleet of constructed reactors was strongly improved 
in the 1990s and achieved very high standards both economically and safety-wise, with 
average availability exceeding 90%. At the same time, a very large part of the existing 
reactor fleet has been or is expected to be authorized to operate for up to 60 years.  So 
we  have  a  contrast  between  poor  construction  experience  and  good  operating 
experience. As a result, the financial community considers nuclear construction as a 
more risky business than construction of coal-fired power plants (the real competition to 
nuclear today in the US), and has penalized new nuclear construction by increasing the 
cost of capital for new nuclear plants to 11%/year instead of 7.8% for coal plants (see 
MIT 2003 report, updated in 2008). 
Under these conditions, the MIT report calculates that new nuclear power plants will not 
be competitive with coal plants without a strong penalty for CO2 emissions. However, 
the same report indicates that if the capital cost of nuclear plants were the same as 13 
 
costs for coal or gas-fired plants, nuclear power would be competitive in the US with coal 
and gas-fired power on a levelized lifetime cost basis. 
In  addition,  the  US  federal  system,  which  devolves  much  authority  to  the  states, 
sometimes makes it more difficult to go ahead with a large national program even if the 
program is strongly supported by the federal government and the Congress, which was 
the  case  for  nuclear  energy  under  Republican  presidents.  The  administration  of 
President Obama  and the Democratic Congress are perhaps less enthusiastic about 
nuclear, although we don't know exactly what will be their attitude after they experience 
the  real  cost  of  CCS  or  renewable  energies  in  limiting  CO2  emissions.  Limiting  CO2 
emissions is certainly now a major goal, and maybe even more important for the Obama 
administration than for the previous Republican administration.  
Four years ago, in view to promote nuclear as a way to limit CO2 emissions and enhance 
security  of  supply,  the  US  Congress  enacted  a  law  that  provides  for  substantial 
subsidies and loan guarantees for the first six new nuclear power plants. One might 
have expected that this would lead quickly to construction of these first six Generation 3 
plants, especially since regulation was also streamlined - one-stop licensing, early site 
permitting, generic design approval. But in fact there is large interest - some 17 to 20 
projects are under consideration for construction - but construction has not yet started.  
Part of the explanation is the long time taken by the Department of Energy to implement 
the subsidies. It seems today that new plant orders may start in 2010. 
In our opinion there exists another major issue for nuclear energy in the US. It is the 
disposal  of  spent  fuel  and/or  final  waste,  which  is  the  responsibility  of  the  federal 
government. The fight between the US federal government and the state of Nevada, 14 
 
which opposes the construction of a spent fuel repository in Yucca Mountain, makes the 
success of the project very doubtful, illustrating the power of the "NIMBY syndrome" 
("not  in  my  back  yard").  After  years  of  development  and  expenditures  of  billions  of 
dollars,  it  is  still many  years  from  operation,  and  recently  the  Obama  administration 
seems to have given up on this project, bowing to Senator Reid, who is president of the 
Senate  and  Senator  of  Nevada.  The  new  position  is  that  spent  fuel  can  be  kept  in 
storage at reactor sites or at temporary storage sites above ground or in shallow storage 
vaults, for 100 years. During this time, a policy can be developed for spent fuel disposal 
or  perhaps  reprocessing  and  reusing some  "precious"  elements  -  plutonium and  the 
remaining uranium - and burning some of the more radiotoxic products so as to diminish 
sharply the radiotoxicity of the final waste and facilitate its disposal. This seems very 
reasonable  on  paper,  but  it  requires  clear  development  to  ensure  that  within  the 
necessary time - 100 years minus the 40 years or so for already operating reactors - 
there will be a solution. This is a fundamental issue and as long as it is not resolved 
poses problems for nuclear energy. At the same time, , as we noted earlier, as long as 
only about 1% of natural uranium is used to produce energy - because breeders are 
rejected  -  uranium  resources  may  become  a  problem  in  the  next  30  or  40  years 
depending  on the pace of nuclear power development. The refusal of breeders also 
creates a major difference between nuclear and renewables, the first becoming only a 
short-time transitional solution. This is illustrated by the 2008 MIT report, which observed 
that there is an inconsistency because some states, and maybe in the future federal 
governments, mandate a minimum use of renewable to produce electricity independent 
of the cost in view to diminish CO2 emission, but at the same time these regulations do 
not  include  nuclear  energy  or  coal  with  CCS,  which  also  minimized  CO2  emissions. 15 
 
Therefore,  it  may  play  against  the  cheapest  way  to  reduce  CO2  emissions.    This 
inconsistency may be explained, at least in part, by the short-term character of present 
nuclear technology. 
On the contrary, if the breeder concept, which was initiated in the US, is accepted and 
developed, the use of more than 60% of natural uranium is possible and one can use 
very expensive uranium - perhaps even the abundant resources in seawater or granite - 
making nuclear energy a quasi-renewable energy, as we mentioned earlier. That should 
make a big difference in how nuclear energy is perceived. The GNEP - Global Nuclear 
Energy Partnership - proposed by former President Bush began to address this issue by 
considering construction of a fast neutron reactor which would burn plutonium and other 
toxic  elements  but  could  easily  be  converted  to  breeder  even  if  it  was  designed 
specifically to decrease the radiotoxicity of final waste and to facilitate its disposal. 
It seems to us therefore that there are two major issues that will influence the nuclear 
energy development in the US:   
·  whether or not the construction of six Generation 3 nuclear power units is realized 
on time and within budget;   
·  how the issue of reprocessing, waste disposal and ultimately the breeder reactor 
is addressed.  
The  answer  to  these  questions  may  make  a  huge  difference  in  the  development  of 
nuclear energy in the US, which needs many power plants and has the financial and 
technical ability to build such a fleet. The MIT 2008 study projects some 300 Gwe of 16 
 
nuclear generating capacity in the US in 2050; the EPRI study shows similar numbers 
(see figure). 
Figure:  EPRI’s PRISM analysis projects a possible electricity generation mix for 
achieving substantial carbon dioxide emission reductions. 
 
Source : EPRI (2009) 
III. 2 France 
Let's look at the country which is the second largest nuclear power producer in the world 
today: France, with more than 60 GWe of nuclear power capacity operating successfully. 
Most of these nuclear power plants were built under Westinghouse license, but due to 
the different ways the industry  operated in France and in the US and to continuous 
strong support from all political parties as well as from society at large, and to better-
adapted legal and regulatory systems, the program was a success. Except for the last 
four units -- whose design was derived from Westinghouse technology but free of the 17 
 
Westinghouse license and which therefore were first-of-a-kind and experienced some 
delays and extra cost -- the French nuclear fleet was built practically on schedule and at 
no more than a few percent above the initial budget.  It was therefore a commercial 
success. The operation of its fleet is also good - the availability is not as good as in the 
US, about 80% compared to 90% in the US, but there are reasons for this which would 
be too long to explain here. 
Today in France, with a reasonable assumption for the cost of oil (about $60/barrel) and 
of gas, and probably of coal, which is more or less linked to oil and in spite of a sharp 
increase in capital cost compared to existing units, nuclear power is competitive even 
without a CO2 penalty for fossil fuel. We are referring here to the new 1,650-MW-class 
EPR plant under construction at Flamanville. 
Considering this situation, France's major utilities, Electricite de France and the Franco-
Belgian GDF-Suez, are very eager to build more nuclear plants. However, the need in 
France for baseload electricity over the next 20 years is limited; therefore, today France 
is building only one EPR in Flamanville and has decided to build a second one in Penly 
beginning in 2012. On the other hand, the two utilities mentioned above have many 
plans to participate in building nuclear plants outside France - EDF is participating in two 
units in China and proposes to build at least four in the UK, four in the US, and four in 
Italy. GDF-Suez wants to participate in nuclear construction in the UK. Both GDF-Suez 
and EDF are participating in a French consortium proposing two nuclear units in the 
United Arab Emirates.  
The fact that they are willing to commit money for new projects shows clearly their belief 
that nuclear power is a sound investment in France and in other selected countries. 18 
 
The two main lessons to be learned from the French experience are: 
·  A very dynamic expansion of nuclear power worldwide, as foreseen by the 
highest projections, should not be impossible from the industrial point  of 
view, since France, a medium-sized country, was able to expand its nuclear 
capacity by more than 50 GWe in 20 years, rising from a few percent of 
nuclear electricity to close to 80% over this period. 
·  Strong and constant support for the nuclear program from politicians and to 
a large extent from society, combined with a rational industrial organization 
and a good base of technically skilled workforce led to a technically and 
economically successful program. Today, French nuclear power plants and, 
more generally, French nuclear industry are important assets for the French 
economy upon which many other countries look with envy. 
III. 3 China 
Let's now have a look at the situation in China. This country, according to the WEO 
2008, will have the largest increase of electricity demand in the world over the next 20 
years, more than one-third of the worldwide increase or some 500 GWe. China has the 
financial and technical resources to achieve it. For a very large majority of these new 
plants - more than 80% - the choice will be between coal and nuclear.According to a 
Chinese official cited in the specialized publication Nucleonics Week, rising prices of 
imported  coal,  followed  by  higher  prices  for  domestic  coal,  make  nuclear  plants 
economically more attractive than coal (see Platts Nucleonics Week, 30 April 2009). 19 
 
We  assume  that  this  statement  concerns  modern  coal  plants  which  strictly  limit 
emissions of SO2, NOx, and particulates according to international standards. 
The  older,  much  cheaper  but  more  polluting  technology  is  still  used  for  some 
construction of new coal-fired plants in China, but the disastrous health effects of these 
plants on a local, but also regional level (South Korea, Japan or even California) tend to 
favor the more expensive clean coal plants. 
The above facts, combined with problems of domestic coal transportation by rail, which 
is  saturated,  and  with  the  will  of  the  Chinese  government  to  limit  in  the  future  the 
increase in CO2 emissions, make nuclear very attractive. The Chinese government is 
now giving nuclear development high priority. Recently, the goal of nuclear electricity 
production  by  2020  was  increased  from  3.5%  to  5%  or  more  of  total  electricity 
production, versus today's level of less than 2%. There are also indications of plans for 
some 60 GWe or more of nuclear in operation in 2020 and 100 GWe to 160 GWe by 
2030. Today there are less than 9GWe of nuclear in operation in China.  
From the industrial point of view, the situation is quite favorable. Generation 2 reactors 
built recently by Russian, Canadian and French industry were, with some exceptions, on 
schedule and within budget. China ordered in 2008 Generation 3 reactors of foreign 
technology  from  Toshiba/Westinghouse  (four AP1000  units  of  1,100 MWe)  and  from 
Areva two 1,650-MWe EPR units, and in the near future may order two to four 1,200-
MWe  VVERs  of  Russian  design.  Chinese  industry  is  also  building  "Generation  2+" 
reactors of 1,000 MWe class, based on French technology. 
The Chinese industry is also developing, in cooperation with Toshiba/Westinghouse, a 
larger  version  of  the  AP1000,  designed  to  produce  up  to  1,400  MWe,  planned  for 20 
 
operation  in  2017-2019,  and  may  later  design  a  1,700-MWe  PWR  based  on 
Toshiba/Westinghouse technology (see Platts Nucleonics Week, 23 April 2009 and 28 
May  2009).  These  large  Chinese-Japanese-American  designs  are  expected  to  lower 
substantially the cost per kilowatt-hour (see NW 18 October 2007). Other sources (Alain 
Tournyol du Clos, the nuclear attaché of the French embassy in China, 2009), gives 
indications of tentative plans for 70 GWe of nuclear capacity in 2020 and 250 GWe in 
2050, producing some 20% of China's total electricity production.  
We may conclude that a strong development of nuclear energy is under way in China, 
maybe even stronger than assumed in most scenarios mentioned in this paper. 
Conclusion 
There are strong signs that nuclear energy development over the next 20 to 40 years will 
be very dynamic, at least in Asia - China, India, Japan, and South Korea. On the other 
hand, there are large uncertainties regarding the pace of development in other parts of 
the world, notably in the US and some European countries.  We can see that Asian 
industry  -- currently  based in Japan and South Korea -- already plays a major role in 
nuclear development worldwide and will likely play an even more important role in the 
future  when  the  Chinese  and  Indian  nuclear  industries  will  mature  and  strike  out  to 
foreign markets. 
The development of nuclear energy in the world, an essential element of sustainable 
development, could be strongly accelerated if nuclear energy - as would appear rational 
- were accepted in the future post-Kyoto agreement as a clean technology eligible for 
credits under the Clean Development Mechanism. 21 
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